Abstract. We study robust secret sharing schemes in which between one third and one half of the players are corrupted. In this scenario, robust secret sharing is possible only with a share size larger than the secrets, and allowing a positive probability of reconstructing the wrong secret. We focus on the most challenging case where the number corruptions is just one less than the number of honest players. In the standard model, it is known that at least m + k bits per share are needed to robustly share a secret of bit-length m with an error probability of 2 −k ; however, to the best of our knowledge, no efficient scheme matches this lower bound: the one that gets closest has share size m + O(n + k), where n is the number of players in the scheme. We show that it is possible to obtain schemes with close to minimal share size in a model of local adversaries, i.e. in which corrupt players cannot communicate between receiving their respective honest shares and submitting corrupted shares to the reconstruction procedure, but may coordinate before the execution of the protocol and can also gather information afterwards. In this limited adversarial model, we prove a lower bound of roughly m + k bits on the minimal share size, which is (somewhat surprisingly) similar to the lower bound in the standard model, where much stronger adversaries are allowed. We then present efficient scheme that essentially meets our lower bound, and has shorter share size than any known efficient construction in the standard model for the same set of parameters. For our construction, we introduce a novel procedure that compiles an error correcting code into a new randomized one, with the following two properties: a single local portion of a codeword leaks no information on the encoded message itself, and any set of portions of a codeword reconstructs the message with error probability exponentially low in the set size.
Introduction
While many cryptographic primitives require computational hardness assumptions to leverage restrictions on an adversary's computing power, the fundamental primitive of secret sharing protects data information-theoretically. This is accomplished by dispersing a secret among several parties, a sufficient number of whom are trustworthy. In a classical secret sharing scheme (as introduced independently by Shamir [23] and Blakely [4] ), a dealer shares a secret among n parties such that any t+1 of them can reconstruct the secret, but any coalition of at most t players cannot learn anything about the secret. This is an informationtheoretic guarantee, requiring that the joint distribution of any t shares must be independent of the secret.
Applications of secret sharing schemes range widely from secure multiparty computation (MPC), secure storage, secure message transmission, and distributed algorithms. In some of these applications, particularly secure storage and message transmission, an additional feature of "robustness" is desirable. Robust secret sharing is defined to satisfy all the usual properties of secret sharing, while additionally requiring that when the reconstruction procedure receives at most t adversarially corrupted shares out of n, it still outputs the correct secret (with sufficiently high probability).
Prior works on robust secret sharing (e.g. [22, 7, 5, 10, 9] ) have focused on robustness against a "monolithic" adversary, i.e. a (computationally unbounded) centralized adversary who maliciously corrupts t parties and submits arbitrary values for their shares to the reconstruction procedure, potentially using all of the joint information present in the t shares initially received by the corrupted parties. In this model, it is known that for t < n/3 robust secret sharing schemes can be perfect, i.e. for any admissible adversary the reconstruction procedure outputs the correct secret with probability one (e.g. Shamir secret sharing, with Reed-Solomon decoding achieves this property). Interestingly, for n/3 ≤ t < n/2 robust secret sharing is possible, but only by allowing a positive reconstruction failure probability [8] . In this scenario, Cevallos et al. [9] presented a polynomial time robust secret sharing scheme over m-bit messages with share sizes of m + O(k + n) and reconstruction failure probability of 2 −k . This scheme has the lowest share size among efficient schemes in this model, but does not match the best known lower bound of m + k [7] . Our work is motivated by the following question:
Can the share size be significantly reduced with additional, but reasonable, restrictions on the adversary?
We identify a very natural and realistic adversary for which we construct a scheme with considerably shorter shares -while still maintaining efficiency. In this new adversarial model, we also prove a lower bound of m + k − 2 − log 2 (3) bits on the share size, which essentially matches our constructions' shares and is almost identical to the best known lower bound in the standard model, in which much stronger adversaries are allowed. By constructing a scheme that approximately attains our lower bound, we have a rather complete understanding of the share sizes that can be obtained for robust secret sharing schemes in this model, a degree of precision that has not yet been achieved against the standard monolithic adversary.
Our Adversarial Model. We consider a "local" adversary, meaning that the t corrupted players cannot communicate with each other during the execution of the protocol -but they may arbitrarily coordinate before and after (the latter to try to gain knowledge on the secret). This means that each of the corrupted parties must decide on his malicious share to submit to the reconstruction procedure based only on some pre-determined strategy and the one honest share it has received from the dealer. This model carries some similarities to the work of Lepinski et al. [18] , in the context of collusion-free protocols. In the setting of secret sharing robust against local adversaries, it is still true that for t < n/3 schemes can be perfect, and for n/3 ≤ t < n/2 robustness can be achieved only allowing a failure probability (the same proofs as the ones in the monolithic adversarial model still apply), but in this latter scenario, working with local adversaries allows us to construct schemes with optimal share sizes, still maintaining efficiency.
Motivation for our Model. Local adversaries model several kinds of realistic limitations of adversarial power in many applications. For example, in a secure message transmission, data may travel quickly and realtime cooperation among corrupted nodes may be unlikely. In a large secure multiparty computation, the scale and pace of the computation may also make online coordination among adversarial parties unrealistic. Corrupted parties may also be mutually distrusting, unwilling to coordinate (e.g. if they have opposite goals), or they might not even know about the existence of each other (say in a large scale MPC over the Internet).
Similar adversary models have been well-studied in other subfields of computer science, such as the multi-prover setting for interactive proofs. In the classical result of IP = P SP ACE [24] , a single, computationally unbounded and potentially duplicitous prover must convince a much less powerful verifier of the truth of a particular statement. As was shown in [3] , considering two duplicitous but non-communicating provers greatly expands the class of statements that can be proved, as M IP = N EXP . Removing online communication between the provers is precisely what fuels this expanded power, and similar gains may be possible in other interactive scenarios, including secure multiparty computation and robust distributed algorithms.
In order to capture limited collusion among adversarial parties during the protocol, the locality model can be extended to allow small factions. More precisely, we could allow each adversarially submitted share to depend on the view of a certain bounded number of received shares. We do not address this extended model in this work, but we suspect that similar techniques can be applied to obtain such extensions.
More Details on our Results. As mentioned earlier, we prove two complementary results on the share size of secret sharing schemes robust against a local adversary corrupting t of the n players, where n/3 ≤ t < n/2, and where the reconstruction failure probability is 2 −k .
In the first part of the paper, we show a lower bound of m + k − 2 − log 2 (3) on the minimal share size in this setting. This is somewhat surprising, since it is quantitatively comparable to the lower bound of m + k proven in [7] in the case of a monolithic (and much stronger!) adversary. Our proof uses remarkably little adversarial power to obtain this lower bound: more precisely, we show that this lower bound holds against an oblivious adversary who completely ignores the honest shares given to corrupted parties and replaces them with either default values or fresh shares. We note that working with such little adversarial knowledge requires us to develop new lower bound techniques. In particular, the proof of the previous lower bound of [7] heavily leverages centralized adversarial knowledge of the true secret and all of the shares received by corrupted players. Their argument considers an adversary who maximizes its success conditioned on this knowledge -knowledge that our much weaker local adversary does not have.
In the second part, we construct a poly-time scheme robust against local adversaries whose share size is m + O(k), which essentially meets our lower bound. Our core idea for shrinking the shares is to authenticate all honest shares with a single MAC key that is "hidden in plain sight" from a local adversary. To do so, while still ensuring that the key can be efficiently recovered by the reconstruction procedure, we develop a novel tool integrating error-correcting codes with "locally hiding" distributions, a rather general tool that may be of independent interest.
Compared to the scheme in the standard model with smallest share size [9] , our scheme reduces the share size by removing the additive factor of n. Thus, we see that restricting to local adversaries allows us to considerably reduce share size down to approximately match a proven lower bound, removing any linear dependence on the number of players, while maintaining polynomial time efficiency. This yields a much tighter understanding of what is achievable against local adversaries than what is known against a monolithic adversary in the context of robust secret sharing.
Techniques for our Construction. Previous constructions of robust secret sharing schemes use MACs to authenticate honest shares. Against a monolithic adversary who can view all of the shares received by corrupt players, it seems necessary to use many different MACs to prevent the adversary from compiling enough information about the keys to forge enough tags for corrupt shares. These many MAC keys and tags significantly increase the size of shares.
In the local adversary setting where each corrupt party can only act based upon a pre-determined strategy and its own received share, we can restrict to a single MAC key to be used on each share for authentication. Essentially, we will design our shares so that each party will be given a share that is distributed independently of the MAC key when considered on its own, but the joint distribution of just a constant number of honest shares reveals the key (hence allowing authentication of honest shares).
The basic idea is as follows: each share consists of a Shamir share of the secret, a tag on the Shamir share, and information on the global MAC key (used for the tag). This information has to be conveyed in a way that a single player obtains no information on the key itself (otherwise it could forge its tag), and the key is still retrievable even if nearly half of the shares are corrupt.
In our construction, the dealer embeds the key in a bit-matrix and distributes one row per player in such a way that each single row looks random, but the joint distribution of enough rows reveals the key. More specifically, each bit of the key is encoded as a column of such matrix, as follows: the bit 0 is encoded as a uniform bit-column, while the bit 1 is encoded as either the all-zero and the all-one column, and this choice is uniform. A single row in such matrix is a uniform string; no information on the key is revealed. On the other hand, looking across a bigger number of honest rows (and seeing them all agree at the positions corresponding to 1) allows us to invert the embedding with probability close to one -the failure probability decreases exponentially with the number of honest rows seen. In order to make the failure probability negligible when the number of inspected rows is constant, we encode the key via an asymptotically good error correcting code before the embedding procedure.
A secondary challenge is that looking at corrupt rows can lead to the wrong key. However, it is possible to detect a corrupt key by the fact that it verifies fewer than t + 1 tags with high probability (the honest shares are likely to be incompatible with a non-honest key).
Thus, we can iterate the procedure to invert the embedding of the key through all subsets of shares of a fixed constant size, attempt to reconstruct the MAC key from each set, and stop whenever we find one that authenticates properly. This computation is still polynomial in n and succeeds with sufficiently high probability. This comprises our construction of an efficient secret sharing scheme that is robust against local adversaries, with a significantly reduced share size compared to previous constructions in the standard model.
Techniques for the Lower Bound. To prove our lower bound on minimal share size in this setting, we consider very simple local adversary strategies. We suppose that a local adversary's goal is to cause a reconstruction failure when a challenger generates honest shares from a uniformly random secret. In particular, the adversary identifies a player with a share of minimal length and chooses to corrupt a random set of t of the remaining players and replaces the corrupt players' shares with freshly generated honest shares for a new uniformly chosen secret. Note that these t corrupted shares will be sampled from the same distribution as honest shares, but sampled independently from the true secret. For simplicity of illustration, suppose that this local adversary has replaced the first t shares with its own sample, while the remaining t + 1 shares are honest. Also suppose that the t + 1st share has minimal length (any scenario follows these assumptions, up to a relabeling of the players indices). Then, it is likely that the first t corrupted shares and the honest t + 1st share are also consistent with some honest sharing. At this point, the complete set of shares is ambiguous, in the sense that the first t + 1 shares define a (corrupt) secret, while the last t + 1 shares define another (honest) secret. Now, it is not clear whether running the reconstruction procedure on this set of shares will lead to one secret or the other:
in particular, the probability that an honest sharing agrees with the first t + 1 shares could be different from the probability that an honest sharing agrees with the last t+1 shares -and the reconstruction procedure can take this into account when given an ambiguous set of shares as input (and, for example, output the secret defined by the shares that are more likely).
To address these subtleties, we parameterize the underlying probability space in terms of pairs of secrets and random strings chosen by the share generating algorithm. We group these pairs into various equivalence classes based on collisions of subsets of the resulting shares, and model these equivalences in a layered graph. Our analysis takes advantage of the fact that the adversary can produce the first t corrupted shares in a way that is consistent with the t+1st share without knowing what the reconstruction would output. This crucial property comes as a consequence of the privacy guarantee of the scheme: any first t shares are consistent with every secret, otherwise the adversary would get information on the secret after the protocol is over (and communication between corrupt players is allowed). This is a key source of the precision of our bound as compared to [7] , where they capture adversary success by considering when the adversary correctly guesses an unknown share, making use of all the information on the t shares he is given. We manage to capture the adversarial success without requiring such guesses, and no knowledge on the honest shares given to the adversary.
Our lower bound proof holds for secret sharing schemes that are private, robust, and statistically correct (i.e. we are not requiring that t + 1 shares determine the secret with probability one -however, even if this is the case, by the (t, δ)-robustness property for an n = 2 · t + 1 player secret sharing scheme, we get that t + 1 shares determine a secret with probability 1 − δ).
In summary, we obtain an extremely powerful lower bound, since it relies only upon (weak) local adversaries, and assumes only statistical correctness for the underlying scheme.
Additional Related Work. Robust secret sharing schemes are also considered in [11] , which does not consider local adversaries, but relaxes the model by requiring a gap between privacy threshold and reconstruction threshold (this is commonly known as a ramp scheme). In this setting t/n must be less than 1/2 − ε for some positive ε. Moreover, ramp schemes can avoid the typical restriction that the size of individual shares must be at least as large as the secret size. In this model [11] achieves robust secret sharing with nearly constant sized shares.
Decentralized adversaries are also considered in [1, 6] , which provide frameworks for simulation-based security definitions for cryptographic primitives against local adversaries. Similarly, in the setting of leakage-resilient cryptography, various "local" adversarial models have been studied. For example, the "only computation leaks information" axiom of Micali and Reyzin [20] restricts an adversary to leakage that happens solely on whatever portion of a secret state is currently involved in a computation. Some other works, such as [14] and [13] consider secret state as divided among multiple devices and leaking independently. [2] also present a rather general study of various collusion restrictions on adversarial actors in multiparty protocols.
In this section we list the classic tools and notation used in our paper.
We usually denote distributions by calligraphic letters (e.g. D), random variables by capital letters (e.g. D ∼ D reads as "D follows the distribution D"), and samples by lowercase letters (e.g. d ← D reads "d is sampled according to D"). Moreover, for any set X, we denote by U X the uniform distribution on X.
Definition 1 (Projection). For any integer n, for any set X = X 1 × · · · × X n , and for any I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, we write X I to denote the set i∈I X i . This notation is carried over to the elements of X. We will use the following Chernoff Bound, which appears as Theorem 4.4 in [21] .
Definition 2 (Hamming Weight
). For a vector v ∈ FLemma 1. Let Y 1 , . . . , Y m be independent random variables with Pr[Y i = 1] = p and Pr[Y i = 0] = 1 − p. Let Y = m i=1 Y i and µ = p · m. Then for 0 < β ≤ 1, Pr[Y ≥ (1 + β) · µ] ≤ e −µβ 2 /3 .
Message Authentication Codes Definition 3 (MAC).
A (one time) ε-secure message authentication code (MAC) for messages in M is a function MAC : K×M → T , for some sets K (key space) and T (tag space) such that for all m = m ∈ M, for all t, t ∈ T , and for a uniform random variable K ∼ U K :
Error-Correcting Codes
An error-correcting code for messages that are bit strings of length h is a function
, where c is called the block length. The distance d of the code is defined as min
The number E of adversarial errors tolerated is d 2 − 1 , while the fraction e of errors tolerated is E c . The rate of the code r is defined to be h/c. A decoding procedure is a function D :
An infinite ensemble of codes for increasing block lengths c is said to be asymptotically good if the rate r and fraction of errors e are both lower bounded by positive constants. Such codes are known to exist, and with efficient encoding and decoding functions. For example, Justesen [17] gave an explicit family of asymptotically good codes with block lengths h = 2m(2 m − 1) for each positive integer m with efficient encoding and decoding functions.
Robust Secret Sharing Schemes
Throughout the rest of the paper, we use the following notation:
-n is an integer that denotes the number of players in the scheme.
-t ≤ n denotes the maximum number of corruptible players in the scheme.
-M is the message space. We denote by m the integer such that 2 m−1 < |M| ≤ 2 m . -R is a set that denotes the randomness space used by the scheme to share messages. We assume that the scheme samples uniform elements in R to produce sequences of shares. -S = S 1 × · · · × S n is a set that denotes the ambient space of sequences of shares. For i = 1, . . . , n we denote by 0 i a default element in S i (i.e. an element that any Turing machine can retrieve without any input). For example, if S i is a group, 0 i could be the zero of S i as a group.
Definition 4 (Secret Sharing Scheme).
A t-private, n-player secret sharing scheme over a message space M is a tuple (Share, Rec) of algorithms that run as follows:
this algorithm takes as input a message s ∈ M and randomness r ∈ R and outputs a sequence of shares (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ S. Rec(s 1 , . . . , s n ) → s : this algorithm takes as input an element (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ S (not necessarily output by Share) and outputs a message s ∈ M.
Moreover, the following properties hold:
Privacy: Any t out of n shares of a secret give no information on the secret itself. More formally, for any random variable S over M and uniform R ∼ U R :
Perfect Correctness: Reconstructing a sequence of shares generated by the sharing procedure leads to the original secret, even given n − t − 1 erasures. More formally, for any I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with |I| = t + 1 let ∆(I) ∈ {⊥, 1} n be the characteristic vector of I (i.e. for i ∈ I, ∆(I) i = 1; for i / ∈ I, ∆(I) i =⊥, where ⊥ is a special symbol such that ⊥ ·s i =⊥ for any share s i ∈ S i ). Then, for any s ∈ M, r ← U R :
where * denotes the coordinate-wise product. Remark 1. Jumping ahead, when defining (t, δ)-robust secret sharing, we relax perfect correctness to statistical correctness -i.e. correctness holds with probability 1 − δ instead of 1.
Definition 5 (Merging Function).
Let s ∈ M, r ∈ R and let I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. For i ∈ I, let v i ∈ S i . We define the merging function of s, r with I, (v i ) i∈I as Merge(s, r, I, (v i ) i∈I ) = S ∈ S where for i ∈ I S i = v i , and for i / ∈ I S i = Share(s, r) i .
Definition 6 (Adversary). For any t-private, n-player secret sharing scheme (Share, Rec), we define the experiment Exp (Share,Rec) (D, Adv), where D is a distribution over M, and Adv is an interactive Turing machine, called the adversary.
Exp (Share,Rec) (D, Adv) is defined as follows: E.1. Send the public description (Share, Rec) of the scheme and the distribution D to Adv. E.2. Adv computes and outputs I = {i 1 , . . . , i t } ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, i.e. a subset of players whose size is less or equal to t. E.3. Sample s ← D, and r ← U R , compute Share(s, r) and send Share(s, r) I to Adv. E.4. Adv outputs (v i ) i∈I , where v i ← V i and
is a random variable that may depend on the public information of the scheme, and the ensemble of shares indexed by I. E.5. Return 1 if and only if Rec(Merge(s, r, I, (v i ) i∈I )) = s.
For v ≤ t, we say that an adversary is v-local if for all i ∈ I,
i.e. V i is a random variable that depends only on the public information of the scheme, and at most v elements of the ensemble of shares indexed by I.
Definition 7 (Robust Secret Sharing Scheme). A t-private n-player secret sharing scheme (Share, Rec) over a message space M is (t, δ)-robust if the following property holds:
Robustness: With probability less or equal to δ the reconstruction procedure fails at outputing the correct shared value, even if t out of the n shares are corrupt by adversary. Formally, for any distribution D, for any adversary Adv:
We say that a scheme is (t, δ)-robust agaist v-local adversaries if robustness holds for any v-local adversary.
We prove a lower bound for the share size of any secret sharing scheme that is robust against 0-local adversaries, which implies that this lower bound applies to any secret sharing scheme that is robust against v-local adversaries for any v ≥ 0. 2 (3) ).
Intuition for the Proof of Theorem 1
Here, we give a high level overview of our proof. Let P t+1 be a player associated with a share with the shortest size λ.
An Adversary We relate the value λ to the security parameter k by analyzing the success probability of a (local) adversary that does the following:
1. "decide" whether to corrupt I = {P 1 , . . . , P t } or J = {P t+2 , . . . , P n }. An intuition about how this decision is made is given in the following. 2. sample a uniform message x and randomness r x and compute Share(x, r x ) 3. output Share(x, r x ) i as the corrupt share of P i , for all i in the set of corrupt players.
The decision made by the adversary in step 1 can be thought of simulating each choice (either corrupt I or J) and picking the one that leads to higher success probability. Studying this success probability is a bit tricky. A sufficient way to describe it is by analyzing the probability that:
-the t + 1st share is compatible with the corrupt shares and -the reconstruction doesn't output the correct secret (this latter property alone would suffice, but it is easier to understand it in the presence of the former one)
Intuitively, in order to directly understand the above two properties, one has to understand the distribution induced by the sharing procedure on the shares, which may be cumbersome. It would be helpful to relate the success of the adversary solely on the distribution of secrets and randomness -the uniform distribution.
A Graph -Definition We achieve this feature by relating the above two properties to a graph, constructed as follows: it is a 4-layered graph, where each vertex in a layer is a pair (s, r) for all possible messages s and randomness r. Edges are created according to the following rule:
A Graph -Properties In order to make his decision, the adversary labels the edges between the second and third layer as follows:
The decision he makes in step 1, is merely counting how many edges have a specific label:
Decide to corrupt I if |I-edges| ≥ |J-edges| (corrupt J otherwise) Adversarial Success in the Graph Without loss of generality, assume that the adversary chose to corrupt I. Then, the robustness experiment is equivalent to the following:
-choose a vertex (s J , r J ) uniformly from the third layer of the graph -choose a vertex (s, r) uniformly from the first layer of the graph It turns out that the success probability of the adversary is equivalent to the probability that (s, r) and (s J , r J ) are connected (this implies that the t + 1st share is compatible with the corrupt shares), and there exists an I-edge in the connecting path (this implies that the reconstruction fails). In other words,
Refining, Analyzing Connectivity, and Concluding Now, we can start an analysis of the above property which relates the security parameter to the size of the shortest share. Firstly, we define a subgraph with the specific connectivity property that the number of vertices at layer one connected by a path to a specific vertex at layer three is at least 2 m times the number of vertices at layer two connected to the same vertex at layer three. In other words,
Somewhat surprisingly, this can be done by removing only a relatively small number (2 · 2 −k fraction) of vertices to the second layer of the graph: among others, we remove all those vertices (s, r) such that Rec(Share(s, r)) = s (there is most a 2 −k fraction of them, by statistical correctness), and then use perfect correctness and privacy on the induced graph to obtain the above.
We now use the graph properties to manipulate the resulting probability: the property of the refined graph allows us to essentially "move" the probability mass at the first layer of the subgraph to the second layer, with a gain of a 2 m factor:
(we write ≈ here instead of = to take into account of the small number of vertices removed in the construction of the subgraph.) Then, we can remove the labeling condition by noticing that the adversary chose the more successful among I and J, which means that at least a 1/2 fraction of the labeled edges are I-edges:
The rest of the proof is an algebraic manipulation of the resulting probability which leads to the correct result by using standard probability tools, such as independence of random variables, union bounds, and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We first note that it suffices to prove a lower bound of m+k−(1+log 2 (3)) for |M| = 2 m , since a lower bound for the share size required to share a secret from a space of size 2 m−1 certainly applies to sharing a secret from larger a space of size |M| ≥ 2 m−1 . Throughout the proof, we will therefore assume that |M| = 2 m . Our proof will rely solely on very simple local adversary strategies. Namely, we will need to consider only two possible adversary strategies: one that replaces some subset of t shares with default values of (say) all zeros, and another that replaces them with shares generated with fresh randomness for a fresh (uniform) secret. These strategies are both 0-local because the adversary submits shares that are distributed independently of all the shares that the corrupted players receive. The key idea will be that if one share is very short, then it becomes more likely that the adversary submitting t freshly distributed shares will cause a "collision", meaning that the corrupted shares are consistent with the honestly generated short share. This will make it difficult for the reconstruction algorithm to tell which is the honestly shared secret. We also consider the adversary who submits default values for technical reasons within the argument, in order to prove that there are not too many honest sharings for differing secrets that agree in some set of at least t + 1 shares. If these were too common, the adversary submitting default values for the complement set would succeed in confusing the reconstruction algorithm with sufficient probability.
To carefully study the probability space of pairs (s, r) where s is a uniformly random secret and r is a random bit string used in the share generating procedure, we define a layered graph whose vertices at each layer correspond to these pairs (s, r), and edges between the layers represent agreeing shares for specified subsets of players. Essentially, our graph models various kinds of equivalence classes of values (s, r) corresponding to partial agreements of the resulting shares. To execute our proof, we will identify paths in our graph corresponding to the events of adversary success, and we will then lower bound the number of such edges and hence the success probability of the adversary.
A Graph. (For an intuitive description, see Section 3.1.) Let P ∈ {1, . . . , n} be the index of a player, let I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} \ {P } be a set of cardinality |I| = t, and let J = {1, . . . , n} \ ({P } ∪ I) be the set of size t corresponding to the players that are not in I and are not P . Let G = G(P, I) be a graph defined as:
-Vertices(G) = {1, . . . , 4} × M × R, i.e. the vertex set consists of four layers of message and random value tuples. -((i, s, r), (i + 1, s , r )) ∈ Edges(G) if:
• i = 1, and Share(s, r) I = Share(s , r ) I : i.e. a vertex at layer one is connected to a vertex at layer two if the tuples of shares they define agree on the shares at I. • i = 2, s = s , and Share(s, r) P = Share(s , r ) P : i.e. a vertex at layer two is connected to a vertex at layer three if the vertices represent different secrets, and the tuples of shares they define agree on the share at P . • i = 3, and Share(s, r) J = Share(s , r ) J : i.e. a vertex at layer three is connected to a vertex at layer four if the tuples of shares they define agree on the shares at J.
Path Sets, Labeling, Balance. (For an intuitive description, see Section 3.1.) We want to construct a labeling system for paths from layer one to layer four, that will be useful to analyze certain reconstruction properties of the secret sharing scheme associated with the graph. Firstly, however, we need to construct a function that maps paths containing edges from layer two to layer three to sequences of shares. For 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 4, let E i,j be the set of paths succesively connecting vertices at layer i to vertices at layer j;
formally, , s k+1 , r k+1 ) ) ∈ Edges(G(P, I))}.
We also define another set, E, containing all paths with an edge between layer two and three; formally,
Now, we construct a string function S that assigns sequences of shares to paths in E. Formally, for ∈ E, = (. . . , (2, s 2 , r 2 ), (3, s 3 , r 3 ) , . . . ), define S( ) as the sequence of shares with the following properties:
Notice that the function S depends only on the edges between layer two and three, so any two paths in E sharing the same edge from layer two and three have the same image. Now, for i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {3, 4}, we define a labeling relation L as follows:
Analogously to S, L depends only on the edges between layer two and three of a path. Also notice that L is not necessarily a function, as we do not exclude the existence of paths = (. . . , (2, s 2 , r 2 ), (3, s 3 , r 3 ), . . . ) with s 2 = Rec(S( )) = s 3 . Such paths would be labeled as both I and J. Finally, we say that the graph G is I-oriented if there are at least as many edges in E 2,3 labeled by
Now that we introduced all the required tools and definitions, we are ready to begin our analysis. Setup. Let λ be the minimal bit-length of any share of (Share, Rec). Without loss of generality, assume that P is a player associated with a share of (Share, Rec) of length λ. Construction of an Adversary. (For an intuitive description, see Section 3.1.)
Let Adv A be the adversary who behaves as follows (during an execution of Exp (Share,Rec) (D, Adv A )): 1. Given the public information (Share, Rec), D in step E.1, sample x ← U M , r x ← U R . 2. Compute (v 1 , . . . , v n ) ← Share(x, r x ). 3. Sample a uniform set I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} \ {P } with |I| = t. 4. Construct G(P, I).
If G(P, I
) is I-oriented, output I at step E.2, and (v i ) i∈I at step E.4.
Else, output J at step E.2, and (v j ) j∈J at step E.4. Notice that Adv A is a valid 0-local adversary, since all the computation Adv A performs is independent of the values it is inputed at step E.3. Representing Adversarial Success in the Graph. (For an intuitive description, see Section 3.1.) Assume that, if I is the set chosen by the adversary, the graph G(P, I), induced by the given secret sharing scheme, is I-oriented. Let z ∈ M, r z ← U R , let C be a sequence of shares defined as: for i ∈ I,
Notice that C can be seen as a sharing of z corrupted at I by the above adversary, therefore, by the robustness property:
where the probability is taken over uniform choices of x, z ∈ M, r x , r z ∈ R.
Notice that if there exists (y, r y ) such that := ((1, x, r x ), (2, y, r y ), (3, z, r z )) ∈ E 1,3 and V ( ) = I then Rec(C) = z: in fact, if ∈ E 1,3 , then V ( ) = I implies Rec(S( )) = z, by definition of V ; and since S( ) = C (by the following: order to better analyze the left-hand side of equation 3, we introduce a subgraph G (P, I) of G(P, I), defined by the following algorithm:
While there exist (2, s, r), (2, s , r ) ∈ H a such that s = s : i. Update the graph G by removing (2, s, r) and (2, s , r ):
Notice that the vertices we are removing in this graph might exist, because we are allowing schemes where correctness is only statistical. In the following, we bound the number V R = |Vertices(G (P, I) ) \ Vertices(G (P, I))| of vertices removed from G(P, I) by the above algorithm to obtain G (P, I). To do so, we relate V R to Pr[Exp (Share,Rec) (U M , Adv B ) = 1] where Adv B is a specific adversary, defined as follows:
Notice that Adv B is a valid 0-local adversary, as b depends only on the public specifications (Share, Rec) of the scheme (and therefore it is independent of any value inputed to B at step E.3). Let
Notice that if any element (s, r) of G B is sampled at step E.3 of Exp (Share,Rec) (U M , Adv B ), then Exp (Share,Rec) (U M , Adv B ) outputs 1, by definition of G B . Notice also that the probability of sampling (s, r) in G B at step E.3 is |G B |/|M × R|, as the experiment considers uniform messages (and randomness). Therefore, by the robustness of the scheme,
Now, we want to relate G B and V R . Notice that any two vertices (2, s, r), (2, s , r ), simultaneously removed in step 2(c)i, belong to the same set H a for some a, which implies that
by definition of H a . Combining equation 5 with the fact that {1, . . . , n}\J = I ∪ {P }, it follows that Merge(s, r, J, b) = S = Merge(s , r , J, b). Now, let s ← Rec(S). Since s = s then at least one between s and s differs from s , which means that at least one between (s, r) and (s , r ) lies in G B . Therefore,
In other words, at least half of the vertices (2, s, r) removed in the construction of G are such that to (s, r) ∈ G B . Combining equation 6 with equation 4, we get
General Facts about the Connectivity between Layers. (For an intuitive description, see Section 3.1.) Now that we have a bound on the number of vertices removed from G(P, I) to obtain G (P, I) we can proceed and study how some specific sets of vertices are connected between the layers of G (P, I).
We are mostly interested in vertices on layer one and two. For any vertex (2, s, r) ∈ Vertices(G (P, I)), and for any secret s ∈ M, define C s (2, s, r) := {(1, s , r ) | ((1, s , r ), (2, s, r)) ∈ Edges(G (P, I))} i.e. the set of vertices at layer one that represent secret s and are connected to (2, s, r) . Notice that the set {C s (2, s, r)} s ∈M is a partition of the set of vertices at layer one connected to (2, s, r). We want to show that for any s , s , |C s (2, s, r)| = |C s (2, s, r)|. and therefore violates the privacy of the scheme, as Share(s, r) I would reveal that the secret is more likely to be s than s , but by privacy given any t shares the secret should look uniform. Therefore, for any s , s ∈ M, (2, s, r) ∈ G (P, I):
This implies that any (2, s, r) ∈ G (P, I) is connected to 2 n · |C s (2, s, r)| vertices at layer one (2 n · |C s (2, s, r)| = | ∪ s ∈S C s (2, s, r)|, by the fact that {C s (2, s, r)} s ∈M is a partition). Particular Facts about the Connectivity between Layers. (For an intuitive description, see Section 3.1.) Now, with a notation similar to the one in the construction of G (P, I), for a ∈ S I∪{P } , let
Moreover, let C a := {(1, s, r) ∈ Vertices(G (P, I)) | ∃(2, s , r ) ∈ H a : ((1, s, r), (2, s , r )) ∈ Edges(G (P, I))} i.e. the set of vertices at layer one that are connected to H a . Notice that all vertices in H a represent the same secret: namely, if (2, s, r), (2, s , r ) ∈ H a , then s = s , by construction of G (P, I). Also, for any (2, s, r) ∈ H a , if (2, s, r ) ∈ H a , then ((1, s, r ), (2, s, r)) ∈ Edges(G (P, I)), again by construction of H a , and in particular from the fact that Share(s, r) I = Share(s, r ) I . This implies that for any (2, s, r) ∈ H a , |C s (2, s, r)| ≥ |H a |. Using property 8, we get that any (2, s, r) ∈ H a is connected to a set X of vertices at layer one of cardinality at least 2 m · |H a |. Since |C a | ≥ |X| (as C a ⊇ X), we get Therefore,
Putting things together. (For an intuitive description, see Section 3.1.) We can now proceed and bound the left-hand side of equation 3 in terms of the size of S P . The following calculation starts with a probability space where (x, r x ) and (z, r z ) are independently and uniformly sampled form M × R.
We begin with some simple consequences of our definitions:
(Vertices(G (P, I)) ⊆ Vertices(G(P, I)))
Next we recall that the label of the can be determined without reference to (x, r x ). We will write 2,3 as the edge connecting (2, y, r y ) and (3, z, r z ), and we note that V ( ) = V ( 2,3 ). We note that the condition on x can now be written independently:
Now in order to express this in a more convenient form and then replace the existence condition on y with something easier to manipulate, we introduce a fresh random variable (Y, r Y ) sampled independently and uniformly from M × R:
In this last expression, 2,3 now denotes the edge between (2, Y, r Y ) and (3, z, r z ). Our labeling condition now applied to an edge between two uniformly sampled vertices at layer 2 and layer 3, hence we can directly apply our knowledge that the graph is I-oriented to conclude:
We next observe that the events Y = z and Share(z, r z ) P = a P are independent, by privacy. This allows us to proceed as:
We will next apply a union bound to remove the condition (2, Y, r Y ) / ∈ V R , and then use our prior bound on the size of V R :
(union bound)
Next we reorganize our sum by looking at each a P value and summing over all the values of a I :
The remainder of the calculation is an application of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality after exploiting the fact that (Y, r Y ) and (z, r z ) are identically distributed and now subject to the same condition:
(identical random variables)
Therefore, we must have
An Efficient Scheme
The main idea behind our efficient scheme is similar to many other robust secret sharing schemes in the standard model: in order to achieve robustness we use Shamir's secret sharing scheme and expand each share with some authentication data so that any adversary who submits a corrupt share cannot provide authentication data that matches it. Differently from previous work, however, we have more freedom in what authentication data we can add, since each corrupt share depends only on a single share sent by the dealer, instead of depending on all the shares assigned to the adversary. We use this property and embed the same MAC key into each share and add a tag to the share in such a way that the key is not recoverable by individual corrupt players, while it is recoverable by the reconstructor, who will then check the authenticity of each share. More precisely, we will use our locally hiding transform developed in AppendixA to distribute a MAC key among the parties so that it cannot be learned by a local adversary but can be reliably extracted from a number of honest shares. Recovery of the key and authentication in the reconstruction procedure will be performed by iterating over constant subsets of shares, extracting a candidate key value, and then attempting to authenticate at least t + 1 shares. Since the local adversary cannot learn the real MAC key (during the execution of the protocol), we will prove that is it unlikely that a corrupted share will authenticate properly under the correct key. Similarly, we will prove it is unlikely for an incorrect candidate key to authenticate at least t + 1 shares. The error-correcting code in our locally hiding transform will ensure that when we attempt to extract a key from a subset of honest shares, we produce the correct key with very high probability. Putting this all together, we can argue that the correct key will be recovered and the correct secret will be reconstructed.
Remark 2. After the completion of this work, Daniel Wichs discovered a simplification of our construction, achieving similar parameters. Intuitively, to share a message s, the dealer does the following:
1. create Shamir secret shares s i of s using a polynomial of degree t 2. choose a one-time MAC key z and compute a tag t i ← MAC(z, s i ) on s i via z 3. create Shamir secret shares z i of z using a polynomial of degree 1 4. send (s i , t i , z i ) to P i .
The reconstruction procedure recovers the correct key z from the z i (this can be done via Reed-Solomon decoding and is correct against t corruption), checks it against each tag t i and recovers the secret s from the shares s i for which the check passes.
The key is unknown to the adversaries during the protocol, because they are local and the key is secret shared via a 1-private secret sharing. This means that the adversaries have no chance to forge their MACs during the protocol. Therefore, they cannot change their shares and make the test on the tags pass at the same time. Notice that after the protocol the adversaries can collude and reconstruct the key z, but at this point it is of no use for them, since the reconstructor already retrieved the correct secret s.
We feel that both constructions are of independent interest.
Construction
In the following, we use the MAC defined in Appendix B and the locally hiding transform defined in AppendixA. We let g denote the tag length of our MAC (the bit-length of its keys is then h = 2 · g), and we define an additional parameter d := m/g, where m is the bit-length of messages. The security parameter for the MAC is ε = d · 2 −g . We give an explicit construction of our secret sharing scheme in Figure 1 and 2.
Theorem 2. For n = 2 · t + 1, the scheme (Share, Rec) given in Figure 1 and 2 is (t, δ)-robust against 1-local adversaries, where The proof of Theorem 2 can be found in the full version of this work [19] . The proof of Corollary 1 can be found in the full version of this work [19] .
Remark 3. Note that the restriction that m = Ω(g) can be removed, if one simply shares the shorter secrets in M with Shamir shares over a field of bit length g. In this case, the share size becomes g + c + g = m + c + O(g) instead of precisely m + c + g.
